Constitutional Court: remand substitution a month before expiry is not circumvention of the law

The Constitutional Court dismissed a complaint from a defendant accused of economic crime who challenged the lawfulness of restrictive measures substituting for remand in custody.

Constitutional Court: remand substitution a month before expiry is not circumvention of the law

Constitutional Court rejects complaint of defendant in economic crime case

The Constitutional Court released decision reference no. III. ÚS 1480/26, as reported by Google News CZ — Crime (cs). According to the ruling, the imposition of restrictive measures substituting for remand in custody approximately a month before the expiry of the maximum permissible period of remand does not constitute circumvention of the law.

In February 2025, criminal prosecution was initiated against the complainant and other defendants for economic and corruption-related criminal conduct. The District Court for Prague 5 placed the complainant in remand on 26 February 2025 pursuant to § 67 paragraphs a), b) and c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure — on the grounds of flight risk, collusion risk and substantive risk. The remand was repeatedly extended; on 24 May 2025 the collusion risk ground ceased to exist.

Release from remand with substitute measures

By resolution of the district court in January 2026, on a motion by the European Union-appointed prosecutor, the complainant was released from remand. The court simultaneously imposed supervision by a probation officer, an obligation to remain at the specified residence during set hours, surrender of his travel document into custody, and a ban on travelling abroad. The release thus occurred approximately a month before the expiry of the maximum permissible period of remand.

On the basis of the complainant's complaint, the Municipal Court in Prague annulled this resolution in its entirety. The district court subsequently decided again by resolution of 18 March 2026 in essentially the same manner. The Municipal Court in April 2026 also rejected the complaint against this second resolution as unfounded.

Complainant's objections

In his constitutional complaint, the complainant contested the justifiability of the criminal prosecution and claimed that the chosen legal qualification could not stand, and therefore he did not face a severe custodial sentence. He regarded the release from remand a month before the expiry of the maximum permissible period as a deliberately calculated procedure by the general courts and the European Union-appointed prosecutor, the aim of which was to restrict him at least through substitute measures.

The complainant further criticised the Municipal Court in Prague for annulling the district court's resolution in its entirety — including the ruling on release to freedom — which in his view constituted a violation of the prohibition on reformatio in peius. He also pointed to delays that preceded the decision on release.

Constitutional Court's conclusions

The Third Chamber of the Constitutional Court, with justice reporter Veronika Křesťanová, assessed the constitutional complaint as unfounded. The chamber found deficiencies in the procedure of the general courts, some of which could have affected the complainant's constitutionally guaranteed rights. In the part directed against the decisions of the Municipal Court in Prague and against the district court's resolution of 18 March 2026, the court dismissed the constitutional complaint; in the remainder, it rejected it.

The Constitutional Court had already dealt with the question of the justifiability of criminal prosecution and the continued existence of flight risk and substantive risk grounds in previous resolutions reference no. II. ÚS 1293/25 of 11 June 2025 and reference no. III. ÚS 2376/25 of 16 October 2025. It rejected both complaints at that time as manifestly unfounded. The complainant submitted no new arguments, and the Constitutional Court therefore found no reason to reconsider its position.

On the question of reformatio in peius, the court established that the Municipal Court in Prague did act formally incorrectly when it annulled the district court's resolution in its entirety, and thus also the ruling on the complainant's release to freedom. In material terms, however, the complainant was not returned to remand, and the decision thus does not substantively constitute an interference with his constitutional rights.

Key legal question

The crux of the matter was whether the imposition of restrictive measures substituting for remand approximately a month before the expiry of the maximum permissible period of remand was lawful. The Constitutional Court concluded that the maximum permissible period of remand was not exceeded. For the purposes of assessing whether this period was exhausted, what is decisive is not the length of time between placement in remand and the imposition of substitute measures, but rather the total period for which the defendant was actually in remand.

In other words: the imposition of restrictive measures substituting for remand does not prevent — where all other legal conditions are met — the fact that the defendant is already at liberty at the time of their imposition, provided that the total preceding period of remand did not exceed the statutory maximum. The Constitutional Court did not evaluate release from remand coupled with the application of substitute measures as an attempt to circumvent the rules on maximum permissible period of remand.

Milder measures as a constitutionally compliant approach

The Constitutional Court emphasised in conclusion that the use of milder measures to secure the defendant for a period during which he can no longer be held in remand is nothing illegitimate. Rather, if such a procedure were to be evaluated as an interference with the defendant's constitutional rights, it would lead to a paradoxical conclusion: authorities engaged in criminal proceedings would be more diligently protecting those rights if they kept the defendant in remand and thereby exposed him to further intensive restriction of personal freedom.

The decision thus provides interpretative guidance for situations where courts consider replacing remand with milder measures in the final phase of the permissible period of its duration.

Source: Google News CZ — Crime (cs)

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