Haiti: specialised PNH units facing armed gangs
The PNH has eight specialised units and a budget of 46.3 billion gourdes, but armed gangs continue to expand their grip on Haitian territory.
PNH: eight specialised units, but advancing gangs
According to vantbefinfo.com, Port-au-Prince, 11 September 2026. — The National Police of Haiti (PNH) fields eight specialised units on paper: UDMO, SWAT, CIMO, UTAG, BOID, BRI, BLVV and BLTS. Each has a specific mission. Yet armed groups continue to expand their control over several regions of the country.
The UDMO and CIMO are mobilised for public order maintenance. The SWAT intervenes in high-risk situations. The Anti-gang Unit (UTAG) directly targets armed groups. The Departmental Operations and Intervention Brigade (BOID) participates in multiple field operations. The Search and Investigation Brigade (BRI) handles kidnapping and organised crime cases. The Vehicle Theft Prevention Brigade (BLVV) and the Drug Trafficking Prevention Brigade (BLTS) complete this apparatus, alongside the central criminal investigations directorate (DCPJ), responsible for investigations and criminal intelligence.
Armed groups more firmly entrenched on the ground
Armed groups have membership numbers, technical resources, information and an in-depth knowledge of the neighbourhoods they control. They attack police stations, block roads, kidnap, set up roadblocks and retake certain areas after the withdrawal of law enforcement.
This balance of power contrasts with the resources officially allocated to the PNH. For the 2025-2026 financial year, 46.3 billion gourdes are allocated to the institution, intended to cover salaries, operations, equipment, training and operations.
Trained officers diverted to close protection
One of the core problems lies in assigning specialised officers to the personal security of political figures and private individuals. When an agent who has received advanced training is mobilised for several months or even years to provide close protection, they are no longer available for operations against armed groups. The duration of these postings can also lead to a loss of operational momentum and difficulty in adapting quickly during hostile situations.
The authorities thus face a choice: maintain an imposing protection apparatus for dignitaries, or deploy these same officers in the field to fight gangs.
Structural weaknesses exploited by gangs
When several areas are attacked simultaneously, the PNH must reassign its personnel, reinforce certain sectors and reduce police presence elsewhere. Armed groups take advantage of these readjustments to advance or retake lost positions.
Specialised units often succeed in driving out criminals during their interventions, but fail to durably consolidate control of the sector. This lack of position-holding allows gangs to resurface after each operation.
Intelligence, an insufficiently exploited link
Faced with organised groups, knowing their geographical position is not enough. It is also necessary to identify their leaders, their networks, their financial resources, their weapons, their supply chains for ammunition and their movements. Without this groundwork, some operations risk remaining superficial, without durably affecting criminal structures.
Increased pressure ahead of elections
The population expects concrete results from the 46.3 billion gourdes allocated to the PNH: freedom to move on roads, a return to peace in neighbourhoods under gang control and access to public services. It also hopes to see law enforcement maintain presence in areas retaken from armed groups.
With elections announced for December 2026 and February 2027 approaching, pressure on law enforcement is set to become even heavier. The specialised units will have to secure sensitive areas, institutions, movements and the various stages of the electoral process, in an already severely degraded security context.
Moïse François / Vant Bèf Info
Source: Google News HT — Crime