Police corruption in Peru: organised crime infiltrates state institutions
88% of Peruvians believe corruption has increased over the past five years. Prosecutors are investigating extortion networks within the National Police.
When the Police are the problem: institutional capture and organised crime in Peru
According to expreso.com.pe, an analysis by specialist Jorge Céliz Kuong warns that political inaction and internal corruption are eroding Peruvian state control in the face of organised crime infiltration of the National Police.
In Latin America, organised crime no longer operates solely through weapons or clandestine routes. Its decisive advantage comes when it manages to penetrate the institutions tasked with pursuing it. In Peru, this reality raises a concrete question: how can a state guarantee security when part of its police apparatus serves criminal interests.
Figures reflecting the trust crisis
Data from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) for the period October 2025–March 2026 show that 59.6% of the population identified corruption as one of the country's main problems, whilst 53.6% cited crime. A 2025 Proética survey added another indicator: 88% of those surveyed believed corruption had increased over the previous five years.
These figures express perceptions, not proof of individual responsibility. However, prosecutorial investigations record concrete cases. In April 2026, the Public Ministry reported the preliminary detention of four active police officers under investigation for being part of an alleged extortion network in San Martín. That same month, four other officers were detained in Huaura for alleged crimes including extortion and bribery.
Corruption ascending the chain of command
The problem takes on another dimension when corruption reaches the mechanisms of appointment, promotion and assignment of postings. Allegations of political interference and commercialisation of posts require rigorous investigation, without converting suspicions into convictions. The perverse incentive, nonetheless, is evident: whoever obtains a post through favours may end up answering to their sponsors rather than to citizens.
This is how institutional capture takes shape. A bribe in the street harms one person; the protection of a criminal network compromises entire territories. If operational information is leaked, investigations are manipulated or cover is provided to illegal economies, the state not only loses effectiveness: it facilitates the expansion of crime and increases the cost of formal economic activity.
The state knows of the problem, but does not act
Most critically, according to the analysis, is that the state knows of the problem. Official diagnoses exist, prosecutorial investigations, journalistic reports, surveys and alerts from specialised bodies. What is lacking is not information, but determination. Constant rotation of command and political calculation have allowed corruption to be managed as a nuisance rather than confronted as a strategic threat.
The response also cannot be reduced to indiscriminate purges or increased military presence. Both of these options offer immediate political signals, but can weaken professional capacities and democratic controls. The Police retain personnel who fulfil their duty under difficult conditions; serious reform must protect them and distinguish individual responsibilities from systemic failings.
Institutional reform: verifiable promotions and civil oversight
The priority identified in the analysis is to rebuild incentives and controls. Promotions must be based on verifiable records, external evaluations and public criteria. High-ranking officials need proportionate asset controls, monitoring of conflicts of interest and justified rotation in posts exposed to illicit gains. The Inspectorate requires functional autonomy, whistleblower protection and independent civil oversight.
It also falls to measuring results beyond arrests: firm sanctions, concluded investigations, asset recovery and public confidence. Without effective coordination with prosecutors and judges, any restructuring will remain on paper. Policy continuity matters as much as its design, given that frequent changes of command hinder any real evaluation.
A concrete requirement for the Government, Congress and the Police
The analysis concludes that national security begins with the integrity of those exercising legitimate force. The Government, Congress and the Police themselves should approve a public, scheduled and verifiable institutional reform programme, with targets, budget and identifiable persons responsible. Announcing commissions or promising zero tolerance is insufficient: there must be concrete consequences for those who cover up, purchase or allow the capture of the state.
Recovering the Police, Céliz Kuong concludes, requires sustained technical decisions, civil control and judicial cooperation, not partisan loyalties or passing campaigns. Sovereign control will be demonstrated when no private network can purchase public authority.
Source: Google News PE — Crime